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INTRODUCTION 
In Royal v Smurthwaite (2007) 47 MVR 401, the appellant and respondent’s vehicles 
had collided at an intersection of the Pacific Highway in March 2001.  Smurthwaite 
sued Royal and the Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (RTA) in negligence.  At trial 
it was held that Royal had breached his duty of care and that Smurthwaite was 
contributory negligent.   The claim against the RTA was dismissed.  Royal appealed 
alleging, among other issues, that the trial judge’s dismissal of the case against the 
RTA was incorrect.  A majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that 
the RTA was liable in negligence for failing to take reasonable steps in relation to the 
design of an intersection on the Pacific Highway to avoid foreseeable risk of harm to 
road users.  The court held that the RTA should bear one-third of the judgment against 
Royal. 
 
 The RTA sought leave to appeal to the High Court.  Leave was given to challenge 
the Court of Appeal’s finding that RTA’s breach caused the loss of Smurthwaite but 
not the issue of breach.  In the appeal (Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal (2008) 82 
ALJR 870; 245 ALR 653; HCA 19) the RTA argued that the collision between Royal 
and Smurthwaite was not caused by any breach of the RTA’s duty of care, that it was 
purely due to the negligent driving of those parties.  It was also argued that the 
majority of the Court of Appeal had failed to examine whether there was causation 
between the RTA’s failure to take reasonable steps in respect of the design of the 
intersection and the accident before considering whether Royal’s negligent driving 
broke the supposed chain of causation. 
MAJORITY DECISION – GUMMOW, HAYNE, HEYDON AND KIEFEL JJ 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ delivered a joint judgment.  Their Honours dealt 
first with the submission that the Court of Appeal had failed to make any finding 
about causation.  The Court of Appeal had held that the RTA was in breach of its duty 
for failing to deal with a ‘known danger’ (Royal v Smurthwaite (2007) 47 MVR 401 
at [91]) – the statistical evidence demonstrated that the design of the intersection 
materially contributed to the collision as the negligent design ‘heightened the risk of 
such an accident’ (at [85]).  The negligent design was that when there were two 
vehicles in adjoining lanes approaching the intersection, one vehicle might obscure 
the other.  However, at trial it was clearly established by the evidence of other road 
users approaching the intersection at the time of the accident, that Royal’s car had not 
been obscured by another vehicle.  In the joint judgment at [25] it was held: 
 
even if it could be said that the appellant’s breach of duty “did materially 
contribute” to the occurrence of an accident, “by creating a heightened risk of 
such an accident” due to the obscuring effect of one vehicle on another in an 
adjoining lane, it made no contribution to the occurrence of this accident. 
 
 As to the submission that RTA’s breach, the failure to redesign the intersection, 
did not contribute to the accident, the majority also accepted RTA’s argument.  At 
[29] the cause of the collision is discussed.  Smurthwaite and Royal were able to see 
each other clearly prior to the accident.  Smurthwaite could either ‘move decisively 
across the intersection or … wait until the cars on the Pacific Highway passed’ and 
Royal had sufficient time to ‘stop, slow down, change lanes or otherwise avoid a 
collision’ and therefore the ‘design of the cross-intersection was … irrelevant to the 
cause of the accident’ (at [29]). 
 
 Royal relied upon the decisions of Betts v Whittingslowe (1945) 71 CLR 637, 
March v Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 and Bennett v Minister of 
Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408.  Their Honours pointed out that in Betts, 
Dixon J’s statement that an inference may be made that an accident did occur due to 
breach of a duty ‘in absence of any sufficient reason to the contrary’ ((1945) 71 CLR 
637 at 649) did not apply to the case before it as the behaviour of Smurthwaite and 
Royal was sufficient evidence to the contrary (at [31]).  In respect of March v 
Stramare and Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare, it was observed that the 
discussions of intervening acts breaking the chain of causation in those cases are 
based upon the assumption that a breach of duty was causative (at [32] and [33]).  As 
the chain of causation between the accident and the failure of RTA to redesign the 
intersection had not been established, the decisions did not apply in this case.  The 
expert report examining the intersection suggested that there should be a staggered T-
intersection in place of the cross-intersection.  Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ stated 
at [33]  
 … to say [if there had been a staggered T-intersection the plaintiff would not 
have been trying to negotiate a cross-intersection and would not have been 
injured doing so] is only to say that there would not have been a cross-
intersection collision if there had not been a cross-intersection. It does not say 
that there would not have been a collision between drivers as careless as the 
defendant and the plaintiff as the plaintiff came onto the Pacific Highway ... 
 
 Kiefel J at [144] stated, after discussing Betts v Whittingslowe and March v 
Stramare (E & MH) Pty Ltd: 
 
  The present state of authority does not accept the possibility of risk of injury 
as sufficient to prove causation. It requires that the risk eventuate (Chappel v 
Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 at 244–5; ALR 524–6 per McHugh J).  Kitto J in 
Dunkel said that one “does not pass from the realm of conjecture into the 
realm of inference” unless the facts enable a positive finding as to the 
existence of a specific state of affairs (Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 
305; [1959] ALR 367 at 370).  Spigelman CJ pointed out in Seltsam, with 
respect to an increased risk of injury, that the question is whether it did cause 
or materially contribute to the injury actually suffered (Seltsam Pty Ltd v 
McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [118]).  This inquiry is consistent with 
the commonsense approach required by March. 
 
Further at [145] Kiefel J stated: 
   
  It is not sufficient to suggest that there was a statistical possibility of an 
accident at the intersection because it was not the best design. To hold the 
RTA liable on this account would be to impose something approaching 
absolute liability. The accident was caused by driver error. 
DISSENTING JUDGMENT – KIRBY J 
Kirby J dismissed the appeal, holding that the RTA’s breach of duty had materially 
contributed to the collision (at [101]).  His Honour held that Santow JA of the Court 
of Appeal clearly had addressed the issue of causation and had concluded that the 
RTA had materially contributed to the heightened risk of the accident as the design of 
the intersection required a driver in the position of Smurthwaite to cross across two 
lanes of traffic travelling at high speed (at [100]).  Kirby J pointed out: 
 
• There was statistical evidence that the RTA had created the hazard for cross traffic 
at the intersection;  
• RTA had failed to take any mitigating action to lessen the heightened risk; 
• RTA was aware of the hazard; 
• The fact that the RTA had moved the stop sign closer to the intersection after the 
collision demonstrated what it might have done to mitigate the risk; and  
• The standard of care owed by the RTA required it to take care in ‘highway design, 
construction and maintenance and take into account all material circumstances, 
including imperfections on the part of the users of the road’ which includes human 
misjudgment (at [104]). 
 
 One of the functions of torts law is to ‘encourage appropriate conduct (including 
on the part of public officials) by the imposition of appropriate monetary sanctions’ 
(at [114]).1  Kirby J expressly disagreed with Kiefel J’s statement that to uphold the 
approach of the majority of the Court of Appeal would impose something close to 
absolute liability (at [116]).  The accident occurred due to driver error and the failure 
of the RTA to take reasonable steps to mitigate the danger of the intersection.  To 
exculpate the RTA for the dangers it created by the intersection design did not 
acknowledge its material contribution (at [117]).  At [117] Kirby J stated: 
 
  Until such contributions are brought home to an authority such as the RTA, 
no stimulus is provided by the law of negligence for risk assessment, 
measures of accident prevention and safer highway design constructions and 
maintenance. 
 
His Honour held that the role of torts law in distributive justice and promoting safety 
needs to be maintained (at [114]). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The approach of the majority to the issue of causation is quite different to that of 
Kirby J.  The majority focused on whether the design of the intersection had 
materially contributed to the accident between Royal and Smurthwaite whilst still 
acknowledging the fact that the intersection was a ‘black spot’ of the Pacific 
Highway.  In contrast, Kirby J focused on the fact that the design of the intersection 
                                                 
1  Kirby J referred to J G Fleming, The Law of Torts (LBC Information Services, Sydney, 9th ed, 
1998), pp 13–14; A M Linden, ‘Tort Law as Ombudsman’ (1973) 51 Can Bar Rev 155; A M 
Linden, ‘Reconsidering Tort Law as Ombudsman’ in F M Steel and S Rogers-Magnet (eds), 
Issues in Tort Law (Carswell, Toronto, 1983), p 1; P H Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen 
Remedies for Offıcial Wrongs (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1983), p 184.  See also 
Neindorf v Junkovic (2005) 222 ALR 63; 80 ALJR 341; [2005] HCA 75 at [84]–[85]; New 
South Wales v Fahy (2007) 236 ALR 406; 81 ALJR 1021; [2007] HCA 20 at [169]; Roads 
and Traffic Authority (NSW) v Dederer (2007) 238 ALR 761; 81 ALJR 1773; 48 MVR 288; 
[2007] HCA 42 at [166]. 
created a foreseeable risk of injury and had materially contributed to the increased 
risk of such an accident occurring, agreeing with Santow JA’s ‘impeccable’ reasoning 
in the Court of Appeal (at [102]). 
